Web Application Security

Waving the White Flag: Why InfoSec should stop caring about HTTPOnly

As a company that is constantly working with our penetration testing clients on understanding where they should focus their efforts, qualifying risk is second-nature to us. On one hand, we never want to undersell a risk, and have a client accept that risk based on an improperly informed position. On the other hand, I think …

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Proxying HTTPS Traffic with Burp Suite

This is easy to fix. All we need to do is tell our browser that the Burp CA can be trusted. Because every new installation of Burp generates a different CA, this doesn’t create a risk of somebody else intercepting your traffic surreptitiously with their Burp instance. The actual steps to perform this vary slightly by operating system.

Insomnia plus Burp Suite icons

Getting Started API Penetration Testing with Insomnia

In our blog series on Better API Penetration Testing with Postman we discussed using Postman as the client for testing RESTful service APIs. Insomnia is an MIT-licensed open source alternative to Postman. Its commercial maintainer, Kong, is best known for their microservice API Gateway. Like Postman, Kong offers premium subscriptions for syncing and collaboration functionality. …

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Building Blocks: Professionally Evil Fundamentals Series

We at Secure Ideas love security education. What we enjoy even more is affordable security education. So we decided to start a Professionally Evil Fundamentals Video series. These are short definition videos related to information security and penetration testing. We believe that these videos are for anyone who wants to move into information security or …

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It’s Okay, We’re All On the SameSite

With Google’s recent announcement that all cookies without a SameSite flag will be treated as having SameSite=Lax set by default in Chrome version 80, surely Cross-Site Request Forgery will be dead? Well, not quite… In this post I’m going to demonstrate a scenario in which the SameSite default won’t actually stop a CSRF attack from …

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